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Abstract. We analyze the information an attacker can obtain on the numbers
generated by a user by measurements on a subsystem of a system consisting of two
entangled two-level systems. The attacker and the user make measurements on their
respective subsystems, only. Already the knowledge of the density matrix of the
subsystem of the user completely determines the upper bound on the information
accessible to the attacker. We compare and contrast this information to the appropriate
bounds provided by quantum state discrimination.
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1. Introduction
Random numbers have wide applications [1], ranging from Monte Carlo simulations [2]
via lotteries and gambling to classical and quantum cryptography protocols [3, 4, 5, 6].
For most of these tasks, the privacy of the generated numbers, that is the condition
that the random numbers are neither predictable by any model, nor that an attacker
can obtain information that allows him to at least partially predict them, plays a crucial
role.
A quantum random number generator (QNRG) offers at least theoretically the
possibility to create such unpredictable random numbers [7, 8], due to the physical
nature of their generation process and the inherent indeterminism of quantum theory.
Typical examples of QRNG implementations are photons on a beam splitter [9],
homodyne measurements of the vacuum [10], or laser phase noise [11].
However, real life implementations of QRNG usually suffer from imperfections that
open the door for an attacker to get at least partial information about the generated
numbers. In this article, we employ an elementary two-qubit model for such a non-
ideal QRNG to determine how much information an attacker can maximally gain by
exploiting the imperfections of a QRNG.
We emphasize that our model can be easily implemented experimentally. In order
to implement our model experimentally, two conditions have to be fulfilled: (i) The
control and entanglement of two qubit systems. (ii) The tomography of both qubits.
Fortunately, can be achieved readily. Over the past years, a wide range of experiments
controlling and measuring two qubit systems have been demonstrated, ranging from
superconducting qubits [12], over trapped ions [13, 14] and Rydberg atoms [15], to
entangled photons [16]. Tomography has also been demonstrated for different systems
[17, 18].
1.1. Formulation of problem
For this purpose, we consider the model of a QRNG depicted in Figure 1 which consists
of a single qubit system A, that is prepared in a quantum state %ˆA. The user performs
projective measurements in the direction of the unit vector eA on the Bloch sphere of
the system A. To each of the two possible outcomes he assigns a bit value a, with
a = 0 or a = 1. We denote the probability that the user obtains the bit value a for the
measurement direction eA by WeA(a).
Since the user wants to extract a maximum of entropy, his measurement is chosen
in a way, that the measurement outcomes, and thus the assigned bit values, have
equal probability. In the ideal case, the state %ˆA would be a pure state, but due to
imperfections it is in general assumed to be a mixed state. By extending the system
with a qubit environment B, we can purify %ˆA to a pure state |Ψ〉 in the system A+B.
In the worst case, an attacker, who wants to gain as much knowledge about the
generated random numbers as possible, knows or might even have prepared the complete
state |Ψ〉. The attacker is also aware of the user’s measurement, and can perform a
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a)                                              b)
Figure 1. Model of a quantum random number generator based on two entangled
qubit systems and viewed from the user a) and the attacker b). a) The user sees a
mixed state %ˆA and makes a projective measurement yielding a random bit a. b) The
attacker deals with the complete system A+B in which the mixed state %ˆA is purified
to |Ψ〉. The user still performs a measurement on %ˆA to obtain the bit a, while the
attacker carries out a measurement on %ˆB to receive a bit b. The question is: How
much information about a can the attacker obtain from his result b?
projective measurement on the subsystem B. We denote the measurement direction by
the unit vector eB on the Bloch sphere of the subsystem B. This measurement yields a
bit value outcome b with probability WeB(b), where b = 0 or b = 1.
The question the user has to ask then is: How much information can the attacker
gain from his own measurement result b about the user’s random bit a?
1.2. Mutual information and entanglement
We quantify this information using the mutual information [4, 19, 20]
I(eA, eB, |Ψ〉) =
1∑
a,b=0
WeA,eB(a, b) log2
(
WeA,eB(a, b)
WeA(a)WeB(b)
)
, (1)
that a measurement on the system B can provide about the measurement outcome in
the system A, and vice versa. Here, WeA,eB(a, b) is the joint probability of getting the
measurement results a and b.
We note, that for a separable state |Ψs〉, the measurement results in both
subsystems are independent of each other, that is the joint probability is given by the
product
WeA,eB(a, b) = WeA(a)WeB(b) (2)
of the marginals for all combinations of measurement results a and b and the logarithm
and hence the mutual information both vanish, that is
I(eA, eB, |Ψs〉) = 0. (3)
In order to achieve a non-vanishing mutual information, the two subsystems A
and B must be entangled. Indeed, we shall show that the entanglement between the
two subsystems plays a crucial role for the mutual information.
We gain a deeper insight into the role of the entanglement, by noting from (1) that
the mutual information depends only on the measurement probabilities, which result
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from the measurement operators of the user and the attacker as well as from the state
of the complete system.
Since, we want to model a quantum random number generator, the user chooses
the measurement such that a uniform distribution arises. The user’s measurement is
therefore fixed with respect to the state of the subsystem of the user. The mutual
information is then only dependent on the measurement of the attacker and the state
of the complete system.
To obtain the maximal mutual information, the attacker has to choose his
measurement accordingly. The requirements of a constant distribution for the user
and the maximal mutual information for the attacker reduce the number of degrees of
freedom and the mutual information can only depend on the entanglement of the two
subsystems.
1.3. Discussion of the literature
The question raised in this article of how private the random numbers generated in a
non-ideal QRNG are, is of course not completely new. There already exist different
approaches [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] that allow to estimate the unpredictability of the
“raw” random numbers generated in a non-ideal QRNG. All strategies have in common
that one tries to find a lower bound to the min-entropy of a long sequence of raw random
numbers. This quantity is then used by a randomness extractor to produce a shorter,
but unpredictable sequence of “perfect” random numbers [27, 28, 29].
One approach is to model the setup and its imperfections, and then calculate the
min-entropy from this model [21, 22]. However, in many cases this is quite a difficult
task, and one has to make sure that the model is a good description of the experimental
implementation.
Semi-device independent QRNGs [23, 24, 25, 26], in which states are prepared and
measured in random bases in order to make Bell-like tests on the raw data represent
a different approach. Here, the violation of certain (in-)equalities, for example Bell
inequalities [30], of these data then certifies the non-classicality of the physical process,
and determines a lower bound on the min-entropy. This procedure has the advantage
that one does not need a specific model of the QRNG, while only certain weaker
assumptions on the preparation and/or the measurement devices have to be fulfilled.
Our approach is very much in the line of Ref. [21] but much more specific. In
comparison to the latter paper, we discuss how much information an attacker can get,
and how this information depends on the measured quantum state and the chosen
measurements. This approach gives us the possibility to show how the attacker can
gain information, and how the user of the QRNG can protect himself against it.
Another difference of our approach is that we use the mutual information as the
quantity of interest instead of the min-entropy. However, our results could also be easily
formulated in terms of the latter.
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1.4. Outline
Our article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we consider the case of fixed projective
measurement directions in both the system and the environment, and derive a general
expression for the mutual information. We then focus in Section 3 on the case of a
QRNG, where the user selects his measurement in such a way that the bit a is uniformly
distributed, and obtain the maximal information any attacker can gain. Finally, in
Section 4 we conclude by summarizing our results and providing a short outlook.
In order to keep our article self-contained while focused on the essential ideas we
have included additional material and extensive calculations in three appendices. In
Appendix A and Appendix B we evaluate explicitly the constraints on three parameters
that fully define the mutual information. Moreover, we dedicate Appendix C to a
detailed derivation of the maximal mutual information. Appendix D is devoted to
extending the user’s measurement strategy.
2. Mutual information for projective measurements
In this section we derive a general expression for the mutual information in our QRNG
model for the case, when only projective measurements are performed on both A and B.
We discuss the dependence of the mutual information on the entanglement of the two
qubit subsystems as well as on the measurement directions. The results provided in
this section will serve as the foundation of our analysis of the worst case presented in
Section 3.
2.1. States of system and subsystems
We start from the pure two-qubit state
|Ψ〉 ≡
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
Ψij |i〉A |j〉B , (4)
representing the state of the combined system of A and B by complex coefficients Ψij,
which can be interpreted as the elements of a 2 × 2 matrix Ψ. We quantify the
entanglement between the two subsystems of the state |Ψ〉 by the concurrence
C ≡ 2| det Ψ|, (5)
which can take values between zero, for |Ψ〉 being a separable state, and one, when |Ψ〉
is a maximally entangled state.
When we trace out the subsystem B(A), we obtain the reduced density operator
%ˆA(B) ≡ trB(A) (|Ψ〉 〈Ψ|) (6)
of the subsystem A(B), which can be written in the form
%ˆA(B) =
1
2
(
1ˆ + aA(B) · σˆA(B)
)
. (7)
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Here, the vector aA(B) denotes the Bloch vector of the reduced subsystem %ˆA(B),
and σˆA(B) is the vector of Pauli matrices.
We note that for the two density operators %ˆA and %ˆB, which are derived from
the same common pure state |Ψ〉, the eigenvalues and thus the lengths of the respective
Bloch vectors have to be the same [4], that is |aA| = |aB|. These lengths are furthermore
related to the concurrence, (5), by
C =
√
1− |aA|2. (8)
Alternatively, we can relate these lengths to the purity
P ≡ tr(%ˆ2A) =
1
2
(
1 + |aA|2
)
, (9)
of the density operator of the subsystem. From (8), we find the relation
P = 1− 1
2
C2 (10)
between the purity and the concurrence.
2.2. Projective measurements and probabilities
So far we have concentrated on the state of the combined system. We now analyze
measurements on the subsystems.
For this purpose we assume that the user makes a projective measurement described
by the projection operators
ΠˆeA(a) ≡
1
2
(
1ˆ + (−1)aeA · σˆA
)
(11)
while the attacker performs a projective measurement given by the operators
ΠˆeB(b) ≡
1
2
(
1ˆ + (−1)beB · σˆB
)
, (12)
with a = 0, 1 and b = 0, 1.
The probability WeA(a) to find the bit a given that the user measures in the
direction eA and the system is in the state |Ψ〉 follows from the Born rule as
WeA(a) = 〈Ψ| ΠˆeA(a) |Ψ〉 . (13)
Analogously, the probability WeB(b) to obtain b provided the attacker measures in
the direction eB takes the form
WeB(b) = 〈Ψ| ΠˆeB(b) |Ψ〉 . (14)
By inserting (11) and (12) into (13) and (14) respectively, and exploiting (6) and (7),
we find the marginal probabilities
WeA(a) =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)aeA · aA
)
, (15)
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for the subsystem of the user, and
WeB(b) =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)beB · aB
)
, (16)
for the subsystem of the attacker.
The joint probability WeA,eB(a, b) to find the values a and b, provided the
measurements are in the directions eA and eB, is given by
WeA,eB(a, b) ≡ 〈Ψ| ΠˆeA(a)⊗ ΠˆeB(b) |Ψ〉 (17)
and with the definitions of the projection operators, (11) and (12), this probability takes
the form
WeA,eB(a, b) =
1
4
(
1 + (−1)aeA · aA + (−1)beB · aB + (−1)a+beTAK˜eB
)
, (18)
where we have introduced the matrix
K˜ ≡ 〈Ψ| σˆA ⊗ σˆB |Ψ〉 (19)
accounting for the correlation between the two subsystems.
2.3. Bias and correlation
So far, we have defined the state and the measurement operators for our two-qubit
model. We are now in the position to calculate the mutual information for a general
pure two qubit state |Ψ〉 and projective measurements in both subsystems.
2.3.1. Definitions Inserting the probabilities, (15), (16) and (18), back into the
definition of the mutual information, (1), we find
I =
1
4
∑
a,b
(
1 + (−1)aα + (−1)bβ + (−1)a+bκ) log2(1 + (−1)aα + (−1)bβ + (−1)a+bκ(1 + (−1)aα)(1 + (−1)bβ)
)
,
(20)
where we have introduced the three parameters
α ≡ eA · aA, β ≡ eB · aB, κ ≡ e>AK˜eB. (21)
Here, α and β quantify the bias in the measurement outcome on the subsystem A and B,
respectively, which can be seen by comparing the definition of these parameters with the
marginal probabilities (15) and (16). Moreover, κ reflects the influence of the correlation
between the two subsystems on the joint measurement.
The three parameters are not independent of each other. The bias parameters α
and β both depend on the density operators of their respective subsystem, which are in
general not independent, since both derive from a common entangled pure state. The
parameter κ also depends on this pure state, as well as on the measurement directions,
which also enter in the bias parameters.
In the following we will derive a constraint on these three parameters. For this
purpose, we first derive an explicit expression for K˜
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2.3.2. Constraints A general state |Ψ〉, given by (4), can always be written in the form
|Ψ〉 =
√
λ1 |↑〉 |↑〉+
√
λ2 |↓〉 |↓〉 , (22)
due to the Schmidt decomposition [4], where we have introduced new basis sets {|↑〉 , |↓〉}
in both subsystems A and B. Note that in the state |↑〉 |↑〉, in general the spins do not
have to point into the same direction anymore.
In Appendix A, we derive the expression
K˜ = diag(2
√
λ1λ2,−2
√
λ1λ2, 1). (23)
for the correlation matrix.
From the definition of the concurrence, (5), we obtain
C = 2
√
λ1λ2. (24)
Together with (8) and the normalization condition λ1 + λ2 = 1, we arrive at
λ1 =
1 + |aA|
2
=
1 +
√
1− C2
2
(25)
and
λ2 =
1− |aA|
2
=
1−√1− C2
2
. (26)
When we insert (25) and (26) into the correlation matrix, (19), we obtain
K˜ = diag(C,−C, 1). (27)
Furthermore, by calculating the density matrices %ˆA and %ˆB with help of (6)
and (22), and comparing the result with (7), we find aA(B) = (0, 0, |aA|)>, that is the
Bloch vectors point along the z-axis of their respective subsystem.
We are now in the position to calculate the three parameters α, β and κ. From
their definition, (21), we obtain
κ = CeA,xeB,x − CeA,yeB,y + eA,zeB,z (28)
for the correlation parameter, as well as
α =
√
1− C2 eA,z (29)
and
β =
√
1− C2 eB,z (30)
for the bias of the user and the attacker, respectively.
In Appendix B we prove that (28), (29) and (30) lead to the constraint
1− C2
C2(1− C2 − α2)κ
2 − 2αC2(1− C2 − α2)κβ +
C2 + α2
C2(1− C2 − α2)β
2 ≤ 1. (31)
For any fixed parameter α, that is for a fixed measurement direction of the user, the
equality in (31) describes an ellipse in the κ-β-plane. All valid combinations of the
parameters β and κ therefore have to lie inside or on the boundary of this ellipse.
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2.3.3. Special cases We conclude our discussion by considering the two extreme limits
of the concurrence C: (i) a separable bipartite state, and (ii) a maximally entangled
state.
For any separable state, that is C = 0, the constraint becomes
(αβ − κ)2 = 0, (32)
which is only fulfilled for κ = αβ.
As a consequence, we find that the logarithm of (20) vanishes leading us to
I = 0, (33)
as one would expect.
In the other extreme, when the state |Ψ〉 is maximally entangled, that is C = 1,
the bias parameters vanish in both subsystems, that is α = β = 0, and the correlation
is bounded by −1 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
Inserting these values into (20), the mutual information takes the form
I =
∑
a,b
1
4
(
1 + (−1)a+bκ) log2 (1 + (−1)a+bκ) , (34)
which after performing the summation reads
I(κ) =
1 + κ
2
log2 (1 + κ) +
1− κ
2
log2 (1− κ) . (35)
For κ = ±1, we get
I = 1, (36)
allowing the attacker to obtain complete information about the user’s random bit,
independent of the user’s measurement choice. We emphasize that for a maximally
entangled state the user cannot prevent the attacker from finding out his random bit.
3. Worst-case scenario
In the preceding section we have derived a general expression for the mutual information
of a two-qubit system which depends on the concurrence and the measurements
performed relatively to the reduced density matrices on both subsystems. We now
discuss special measurement strategies of user and attacker and highlight the important
role of entanglement in our scheme. Throughout this section we consider the worst case
for the user, that is the attacker somehow knows the user’s measurement directions, as
well as the complete state |Ψ〉.
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3.1. User’s choice of measurement direction
For a QRNG, a user would naturally maximize the entropy of the bits and therefore
choose his measurements in such a way that he obtains uniformly distributed bits with
WeA(0) = WeA(1) =
1
2
. (37)
According to (15) this requirement translates into condition
α = eA · aA = 0 (38)
for the user’s measurement.
Geometrically, this prescription means eA ⊥ aA, that is the measurement is
perpendicular to the Bloch vector of %ˆA. There are infinitely many vectors eA that fulfill
this condition. Throughout this section, we consider this situation with a fixed eA but
generalize it slightly in Appendix D by allowing random measurements corresponding
to two different eA, which are both perpendicular to aA.
When we substitute (38) into (20), we obtain the mutual information
I =
1
4
∑
a,b
(
1 + (−1)bβ + (−1)a+bκ) log2(1 + (−1)a+b κ1 + (−1)bβ
)
. (39)
The parameters κ and β are not independent, but constrained by the equation(κ
C
)2
+
(
β√
1− C2
)2
≤ 1 (40)
corresponding to an ellipse with the semi-major and semi-minor axes coinciding with
the κ and β axes, which follows directly from (31) for α = 0.
3.2. Maximum of mutual information
In order to guarantee the secrecy of his random bits, the user has to address the question:
What is the maximal information following from (39) any attacker can obtain about the
bit a for the given setting?
3.2.1. Exact expression Since the mutual information is a convex function in the κ-
β-plane, its maximum has to lie on the boundary of the ellipse. In Figure 2 we show
that the mutual information is maximized on the intersection of the ellipse given by the
constraint, (40), and the κ-axis. These points lead to the two conditions
β = 0 (41)
and
κ = ±C. (42)
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a) b)
Figure 2. Geometric determination of the absolute maximum of the mutual
information I according to (39) under the constraint (40). a) The mutual information
(top) is shown in its dependence on the correlation κ of the two systems and the bias
β in the measurement of the attacker. The ellipses in the κ-β-plane (bottom) enclose
all the possible combinations of κ and β that can be achieved by any measurement
direction eB of the attacker. The eccentricities of these ellipses are determined solely
by the concurrence C quantifying the degree of entanglement between the qubits of the
user and the attacker. The green, black and red ellipses correspond to C = 0.3, C = 0.7
and C = 0.9, respectively. Due to the shape of the mutual information, its maximal
value is found on the intersection between the ellipse and the κ-axis, independent
of the concurrence. For increasing concurrences C the mutual information at this
intersection increases. Thus, the maximal mutual information increases with increasing
concurrence. b) Mutual information along the ellipses parameterized by an angle ϕ
and corresponding to the same values of the concurrences C as in a). The angle ϕ is
chosen such that ϕ = 0 corresponds to the intersection between the ellipse and the
positive κ-axis. For symmetry reasons, we only parameterize the ellipse from ϕ = 0 to
ϕ = pi. The mutual information is maximal for the attacker choosing his measurement
for the parameter ϕ = 0 or ϕ = pi, that is at the intersections of the ellipse with the
κ-axis, independent of the concurrence C.
The condition on the attacker’s bias, (41), means that the measurement direction
of the attacker eB is perpendicular to the Bloch vector aB of his subsystem. Hence, the
attacker will also obtain a uniform distribution of his bits. As for the user, there are
infinitely many measurement directions, which fulfill this condition.
The second condition, (42), together with (28), (29) and (38), poses the requirement
eA,xeB,x − eA,yeB,y = ±1 (43)
on the choice of the attacker’s measurement, which restricts the attacker’s measurement
to two directions. He can either choose eB = (eA,x,−eA,y, 0) or eB = (−eA,x, eA,y, 0).
As a result, by inserting (41) and (42) into (39), we find
Imax =
1
4
∑
a,b
(
1 + (−1)a+bC) log2 (1 + (−1)a+bC) , (44)
and after performing the summations the maximal mutual information an attacker can
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Figure 3. Worst-case scenario for the user who chooses a measurement such that
he obtains uniformly distributed bits. The attacker selects his measurements as
to maximize the mutual information. The corresponding mutual information Imax
increases for increasing values of the concurrence C (horizontal axis on the bottom)
and decreases with increasing purity P of the state %ˆA of the user (horizontal axis on
the top). Close to a pure state, that is P = 1, the decrease is linear.
gain by performing a measurement on the environment reads
Imax =
1 + C
2
log2 (1 + C) +
1− C
2
log2 (1− C) . (45)
This expression is the central result of our article. We note, that we can also find the
this result analytically. This rather lengthy calculation is shown in detail in Appendix
C.
It is interesting to note that a similar equation holds true if the user switches
between different measurements. In Appendix D we discuss this scenario in detail.
Figure 3 shows the maximal mutual information, (45), in its dependence on both
the concurrence and the purity. The more the two systems are entangled, that is the less
pure the state of the user, the more information can be gained from one measurement
result about the other.
3.2.2. Asymptotic expressions If the complete state |Ψ〉 is only weakly entangled
corresponding to C  1, we can perform a Taylor expansion
ln(1± x) ∼= ±x+ x2/2 +O(x3), (46)
of the logarithm to second order and thus approximate (45) by
Imax ∼= C
2
2 ln 2
+O(C3). (47)
Hence, for small concurrences C the maximal mutual information only grows
quadratically, and there is almost no mutual information. The additional information
on the more probable bit is almost compensated by the less information about the less
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probable bit. Thus, for small concurrences C, the information an attacker can gain is
almost negligible, providing a certain robustness of such a QRNG scheme against small
entanglement between the QRNG’s system and the environment.
From the viewpoint of the user, (47) means that the mutual information decreases
linearly with the purity for P . 1. Indeed, when we substitute the connection, (10)
between P and C2 into (47) we find
Imax ∼= 1
ln 2
(1− P) . (48)
On the other hand, for values of C . 1 the mutual information grows rapidly with
increasing C, since the positive term in (45) is weighted with a high probability, while
the factor decreasing the mutual information is far less probable.
We finally remark that in our scheme the user needs to know the state %ˆA of his
subsystem, which in general can be obtained by state tomography. The connection,
(10), between the concurrence and the purity of the user’s subsystem then allows the
user to find an upper bound on the privacy of his data.
3.3. Binary entropy
We note that (45) enjoys an elementary interpretation, based on the binary entropy
Hb(p) ≡ −p log2 (p)− (1− p) log2 (1− p) , (49)
for a probability p. Indeed, (45) can be written as
Imax = 1−Hb
(
1 + C
2
)
. (50)
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the entropy of the user’s random
number without any correlation to another measurement result. This value is one, due
to the fact that the user’s bit is equally distributed.
The second term on the right-hand side, which subtracts from the user’s entropy,
is the conditional entropy of the user’s bit, when the attacker’s bit is known. This
contribution corresponds to the entropy that remains, even when the attacker has made
a measurement, and therefore reduces the information he can gain. Interestingly, this
entropy corresponds to a binary entropy, with probabilities
p± ≡ 1
2
(1± C) . (51)
Hence, the concurrence C is a measure of the deviation from a uniform binary
distribution. For a vanishing concurrence the user’s bit is equally likely for any
value of the attacker’s bit, while with increasing concurrence the probability of having
coincidental results between the user’s and the attacker’s outcome increases.
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3.4. Privacy of the quantum random numbers and quantum state discrimination
We conclude our discussion of the worst case scenario by taking a different point of
view on the privacy of the random numbers generated by a QRNG. Indeed the question
of how much information an attacker can maximally gain can also be considered as a
quantum state discrimination task [31, 32, 33]. By performing a measurement on the
subsystem A, the state of the attacker in the subsystem B is a pure state, depending
on the outcome a of the measurement performed on the subsystem A. The task of the
attacker is to discriminate his two states.
When the two states are orthogonal, the attacker can always perform a
measurement, which allows him to discriminate between the two states with certainty.
In general, however, the two states are not orthogonal and therefore there is no
measurement that can decide unambiguously between the two cases.
It is well known, that the maximal mutual information accessible in this case is
bounded from above and below by the inequalities
χJRW ≤ Imax ≤ χH . (52)
The upper bound is the well known Holevo bound [4]
χH ≡ S(%ˆB)−
∑
a
WeA(a)S(%ˆB|a) (53)
with %ˆB|a ≡ |ψa〉B 〈ψa| and the Shannon entropy
S(%ˆ) = − tr(%ˆ log2 %ˆ) = −
∑
k
λk log2 λk, (54)
where λk denote the eigenvalues of the density operator %ˆ.
The lower bound for the maximal accessible information, proposed by Josza, Robb
and Wootters [34], is given by
χJRW ≡ Q(%ˆB)−
∑
a
WeA(a)Q(%ˆB|a) (55)
with the subentropy
Q(%ˆ) ≡ −
∑
k
(∑
l 6=k
λk
λk − λl
)
λk log2 λk. (56)
We now consider the state discrimination task for our problem of the QRNG in
the worst-case scenario. As a first step, we show that the states the attacker obtains
are not orthogonal, as long as the combined state |Ψ〉, defined in (4), is not maximally
entangled.
For the measurement outcome a, the user finds the state
|ψa〉A =
1√
2
(|↑〉A + (−1)aeiϕ |↓〉A) , (57)
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with an arbitrary but fixed phase ϕ.
Therefore the state |ψa〉B in the subsystem B, conditioned on the measurement
result a, reads
|ψa〉B = A
〈ψa|Ψ〉√
WeA(a)
=
√
2 A〈ψa|Ψ〉, (58)
where the probability WeA(a) = 1/2, given by (14), in the denominator ensures
normalization.
We recall the state |Ψ〉 in the Schmidt decomposition, (22), and find
|ψa〉B =
√
1 + |aA|
2
|↑〉B + (−1)a
√
1− |aA|
2
e− iϕ |↓〉B (59)
for the state in the subsystem B, conditioned that the user has measured the bit a.
For |aA| > 0 the scalar product
B〈ψ0|ψ1〉B = 1 + |aA|
2
− 1− |aA|
2
= |aA| (60)
between the two states |ψ0〉B and |ψ1〉B, following from (59), does not vanish, and these
two states are not orthogonal.
In the next step, we calculate the bounds given by (53) and (55). Since the entropy
vanishes for a pure state, the Holevo bound is given by the Shannon entropy of the state
%ˆB of the attacker S(%ˆB).
With the explicit formulas (25) and (26) for the eigenvalues λk and the definition
of the Shannon entropy S(%ˆ), (54), we find
χH = −1 +
√
1− C2
2
log2
(
1 +
√
1− C2
2
)
− 1−
√
1− C2
2
log2
(
1−√1− C2
2
)
(61)
for the Holevo bound.
Since the subentropy also vanishes for pure states, the maximal accessible
information is given by the subentropy Q(%ˆB) of the attacker’s density matrix. By
using the eigenvalues, (25) and (26), of this state, together with the definition of Q(%ˆ),
(56), we obtain
χJRW = −(1 +
√
1− C2)2
4
√
1− C2 log2
(
1 +
√
1− C2
2
)
+
(1−√1− C2)2
4
√
1− C2 log2
(
1−√1− C2
2
)
(62)
for the maximal accessible information.
In Figure 4 we compare our result for the maximal mutual information, (45), with
the Holevo bound, (61), and the minimal accessible information, (62). The result
of our worst case considerations, (45), is thus between the two bounds as expected.
However, our result is strictly lower than the Holevo bound except for the boundary
values C = 0 and C = 1, and therefore an improvement for the user over just assuming the
Holevo bound. This advantage originates from the fact, that the Holevo bound is only
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Figure 4. Comparison between the maximal mutual information Imax, (45), the
Holevo bound χH , (61), and the lower bound χJRW for the maximal mutual information
accessible, (62). The maximal mutual information for a projective measurement lies
between the Holevo bound and the lower bound for the maximal mutual information
for all values of the concurrence except as one would expect. Except for the boundaries
C = 0 and C = 1 the mutual information is strictly lower than the Holevo bound.
dependent on the maximal information contained of the state %ˆB in the subsystem B,
independent of the composition of this state, that is of exact form of the states |ψ0〉B
and |ψ1〉B. The Holevo bound is only tight if |ψ0〉B and |ψ1〉B are identical or orthogonal,
which is only fulfilled if the pure state |Ψ〉 of the combined system is either separable
or maximally entangled. In all the cases in between the Holevo bound is cannot tight.
Our result, (45), is exact, and therefore takes the measurement of the user and hence
the exact form of |ψ0〉B and |ψ1〉B into account.
4. Conclusions and Outlook
We are now in the position to summarize our results and provide a short outlook.
Throughout this article we have discussed the privacy of random numbers created by a
non-ideal QRNG represented by a single qubit system coupled to another qubit system
that models the environment an attacker may have access to and which is due to the
fact that the user cannot prepare a perfectly pure quantum state.
We have provided an upper bound, (45), on how much information the attacker
can gain about the user’s random bit. From this expression, we conclude that the
limiting factor on this bound is the entanglement between the QRNG system and its
environment, quantified by the concurrence. We emphasize that our upper bound holds
without any further restrictions on the user’s or attacker’s measurement scheme.
Moreover, we have shown that our scheme can be interpreted in terms of quantum
state discrimination. This point of view allows us to compare the result to the known
bounds. Since our worst case analysis is exact, our result improves the well-known
Holevo bound in this special case.
We emphasize that our results can directly be applied to different QRNG
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realizations. Furthermore, our analysis can be extended to generalized measurements,
such as POVMs, and measurement strategies, which may lead to a further reduction of
the maximal mutual information. This extension also allows us to include the effects of
detector efficiencies into our existing model.
With these modifications our model will constitute an elementary yet useful tool
to estimate the maximal information the attacker can gain on the numbers created by
QRNGs. We will also be able to extend our model to self-testing QRNG devices, by
further including the state tomography directly into the measurement protocol. Finally
we might improve existing lower bounds on the min-entropy. These topics, however, go
beyond the scope of the present article and will be addressed in a future publication.
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Appendix A. Calculation of the correlation matrix
In this Appendix we will calculate the correlation matrix K, defined in (19), for a general
entangled two qubit state |Ψ〉.
We start from the state
|Ψ〉 =
√
λ1 |↑↑〉+
√
λ2 |↓↓〉 , (A.1)
as defined in (22). Since this state is symmetric in the two subsystems, it is obvious
that the matrix K˜ has to be symmetric too, that is K˜ij = K˜ji.
Thus, we only have to evaluate six coefficients. We start with the three off-diagonal
coefficients. The first one is
K˜xy = 〈Ψ| σˆx ⊗ σˆy |Ψ〉 . (A.2)
By inserting the definition of the state, (A.1), as well as of the Pauli matrices, we obtain
K˜xy = 〈Ψ|
(
i
√
λ1 |↑↑〉 − i
√
λ2 |↓↓〉
)
, (A.3)
which then becomes
K˜xy = i
(√
λ1λ2 − i
√
λ2λ1
)
= 0. (A.4)
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Furthermore, in the case of i = x, y and j = z, we find
σˆi ⊗ σˆz |Ψ〉 = ci,1 |↑↓〉+ ci,2 |↓↑〉 (A.5)
with some coefficients ci,1 and ci,2, depending on i = x, y. These states are clearly
orthogonal to the state |Ψ〉, and therefore we find K˜xz = K˜yz = 0.
Hence, the correlation matrix is diagonal in the Schmidt basis. The only remaining
task is therefore to find the diagonal components. For i = j = x we find
K˜xx = 〈Ψ|
(√
λ2 |↑↑〉+
√
λ1 |↓↓〉
)
(A.6)
which gives
K˜xx = 2
√
λ1λ2. (A.7)
Analogously, for i = j = y, we have
K˜xx = 〈Ψ|
(
−
√
λ2 |↑↑〉 −
√
λ1 |↓↓〉
)
(A.8)
leading to
K˜xx = −2
√
λ1λ2. (A.9)
Finally, for the case i = j = z we find
K˜xx = 〈Ψ|
(√
λ1 |↑↑〉+
√
λ2 |↓↓〉
)
= 〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 1, (A.10)
since the state |Ψ〉 is normalized.
Combining all of the above results, we finally obtain the correlation matrix
K˜ = diag(2
√
λ1λ2,−2
√
λ1λ2, 1). (A.11)
Appendix B. Parameter constraints
In this Appendix, we derive the constraints for the parameters α, β and γ for a general
state |Ψ〉. In fact, we show that for an arbitrary but fixed measurement parameter α
the two parameters β and κ lie inside an ellipse in the κ-β-plane, while the shape of the
ellipse is determined by α.
We have shown in the main article that the three parameters are given by
κ = CeA,xeB,x − CeA,yeB,y + eA,zeB,z (B.1)
as well as
α =
√
1− C2eA,z (B.2)
and
β =
√
1− C2eB,z. (B.3)
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By introducing spherical coordinates in both subsystems A and B, that is
eA(B) =
sin θA(B) cosϕA(B)sin θA(B) sinϕA(B)
cos θA(B)
 , (B.4)
the parameters of (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) can be rewritten as
κ = C sin θA sin θB cos(ϕA − ϕB) + cos θA cos θB (B.5)
as well as
α =
√
1− C2 cos θA (B.6)
and
β =
√
1− C2 cos θB. (B.7)
From (B.5) we get
(κ− cos θA cos θB)2 = C2 sin2 θA sin2 θB cos2(ϕA − ϕB) (B.8)
by bringing the second term on the right hand side of (B.5) to the left hand side and
squaring the resulting equation. Since we have cosx ≤ 1 for all x, we furthermore find
(κ− cos θA cos θB)2 ≤ C2 sin2 θA sin2 θB, (B.9)
which is equivalent to
κ2 − 2 cos θA cos θBκ+ cos2 θA cos2 θB ≤ C2(1− cos2 θA)(1− cos2 θB). (B.10)
Solving (B.6) and (B.7) for cos θA and cos θB, respectively, and inserting these relations
into (B.10) gives
κ2 − 2
1− C2αβκ+
α2β2
1− C2 ≤
C2
(1− C2)2
(
1− C2 − α2) (1− C2 − β2) , (B.11)
which can be rewritten as
1− C2
C2(1− C2 − α2)κ
2 − 2αC2(1− C2 − α2)βκ+
α2 + C2
C2(1− C2 − α2)β
2 ≤ 1. (B.12)
Note, that for a fixed parameter α, this inequality describes the area enclosed by an
ellipse in the κ-β-plane, where the shape and orientation of the ellipse are determined
by α and the concurrence C.
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Appendix C. Maximizing the mutual information
In this Appendix, we analytically derive the maximal mutual information an attacker
can have access to, in the case of a QRNG setting. The measurement of the user is
described by a vector eA with eA · aA = 0.
The mutual information for this setting is given by
I =
1
4
∑
a,b
(
1 + (−1)bβ + (−1)a+bκ) log2(1 + (−1)bβ + (−1)a+bκ1 + (−1)bβ
)
, (C.1)
while the two parameters κ and β are constraint by(κ
C
)2
+
(
β√
1− C2
)2
≤ 1, (C.2)
which means that they lie inside an ellipse in the κ-β-plane.
Appendix C.1. Convexity
It is well known that the mutual information is convex as a function of the conditional
probability WeA,eB(b|a) for a fixed marginal distribution WeA(A), however, it is not
obvious that it is also convex in the κ-β-plane. We now show, that the mutual
information I is a convex function in the κ-β-plane, that is
I(λκ1 + (1− λ)κ2, λβ1 + (1− λ)β2) ≤ λI(κ1, β1) + (1− λ)I(κ2, β2) (C.3)
for every λ with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
We prove the relation, (C.3), to be true, by starting from the right hand side of the
inequality. By definition, we find
λI(κ1, β1) + (1− λ)I(κ2, β2)
=
λ
4
∑
a,b
(
1 + (−1)bβ1 + (−1)a+bκ1
)
log2
(
1 +
(−1)a+bκ1
1 + (−1)b β1
)
+
1− λ
4
∑
a,b
(
1 + (−1)bβ2 + (−1)a+bκ2
)
log2
(
1 +
(−1)a+bκ2
1 + (−1)bβ2
)
. (C.4)
By introducing the abbreviations
x1 ≡ λ
4
(
1 + (−1)bβ1 + (−1)a+bκ1
)
(C.5)
and
x2 ≡ 1− λ
4
(
1 + (−1)bβ2 + (−1)a+bκ2
)
, (C.6)
as well as
y1 ≡ λ
4
(
1 + (−1)bβ1
)
(C.7)
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and
y2 ≡ 1− λ
4
(
1 + (−1)bβ2
)
, (C.8)
we can simplify (C.4) and find
λI(κ1, β1) + (1− λ)I(κ2, β2) =
∑
a,b
2∑
i=1
xi log2
(
xi
yi
)
. (C.9)
According to the log sum inequality [20] we have
2∑
i=1
xi log2
(
xi
yi
)
≥ x log2
(
x
y
)
(C.10)
with x = x1 + x2 and y = y1 + y2.
Hence, we find
λI(κ1, β1) + (1− λ)I(κ2, β2) ≥
∑
a,b
x log2
(
x
y
)
. (C.11)
By explicitly calculating x and y and comparing it with the definition of the mutual
information we find∑
a,b
x log2
(
x
y
)
= I(λκ1 + (1− λ)κ2, λβ1 + (1− λ)β2) (C.12)
Hence, we finally have
λI(κ1, β1) + (1− λ)I(κ2, β2) ≥ I(λκ1 + (1− λ)κ2, λβ1 + (1− λ)β2), (C.13)
proofing the convexity of the mutual information.
Appendix C.2. Extrema
Due to the convexity of the mutual information, the maximum of the mutual information
lies on the boundary of the ellipse. Hence, it is sufficient to restrict ourselves to the
constraint (κ
C
)2
+
(
β√
1− C2
)2
= 1, (C.14)
which is an equality instead of an inequality.
We can parametrize the ellipse by an angle ϕ, such that we have
κ(ϕ) = C cosϕ (C.15)
and
β(ϕ) =
√
1− C2 sinϕ. (C.16)
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Inserting these two equations back into (C.1), the mutual information becomes a
function only dependent on a single parameter ϕ. In order to maximize this function,
we calculate the derivative with respect to ϕ:
dI(ϕ)
dϕ
=
∂I(κ, β)
∂κ
dκ
dϕ
+
∂I(κ, β)
∂β
dβ
dϕ
. (C.17)
First, from (C.15) and (C.16), we obtain the derivatives
dκ
dϕ
= −C sinϕ = − C√
1− C2β(ϕ) (C.18)
and
dβ
dϕ
=
√
1− C2 cosϕ =
√
1− C2
C κ(ϕ). (C.19)
We will now calculate the partial derivatives of the mutual information with respect to
κ and β. For the derivative with respect to κ, we find
∂I
∂κ
=
1
4
∑
a,b
(−1)a+b log2
(
1 + (−1)a+b κ
1 + (−1)bβ
)
+
1
4 ln 2
∑
a,b
(−1)a+b. (C.20)
The second sum vanishes due to symmetry, such that we are left with
∂I
∂κ
=
1
4
∑
a,b
(−1)a+b log2
(
1 + (−1)a+b κ
1 + (−1)bβ
)
, (C.21)
which is in general non-vanishing.
The derivative with respect to β is given by
∂I
∂β
=
1
4
∑
a,b
(−1)b log2
(
1 + (−1)a+b κ
1 + (−1)bβ
)
+
1
4 ln 2
∑
a,b
(−1)a κ
1 + (−1)bβ . (C.22)
The second sum vanishes again due to symmetry relations, and we find
∂I
∂β
=
1
4
∑
a,b
(−1)b log2
(
1 + (−1)a+b κ
1 + (−1)bβ
)
. (C.23)
When we insert this result together with (C.21) into (C.17), we obtain
dI(ϕ)
dϕ
=
1
4
∑
a,b
(
(−1)b
√
1− C2
C κ(ϕ)− (−1)
a+b C√
1− C2β(ϕ)
)
× log2
(
1 + (−1)a+b κ
1 + (−1)bβ
)
(C.24)
This derivative has roots at β = 0 and κ = 0. Unfortunately, it is not obvious from
an analytical point of view that those are the only two extrema. However, numerical
simulations show, that these are the only ones.
For κ = 0 it follows from (C.1), that the mutual information vanishes for every value
of β. Since the mutual information cannot be negative, κ = 0 represents a minimum of
the mutual information.
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Appendix C.3. Maximum
We finally proof that β = 0 is indeed a maximum of the mutual entropy. In order to do
so, we take a look at the second order derivative
d2I(ϕ)
dϕ2
=
∂2I(κ, β)
∂κ2
(
dκ
dϕ
)2
+ 2
∂2I(κ, β)
∂β∂κ
dβ
dϕ
dκ
dϕ
+
∂2I(κ, β)
∂β2
(
dβ
dϕ
)2
+
∂I(κ, β)
∂κ
d2κ
dϕ2
+
∂I(κ, β)
∂β
d2β
dϕ2
, (C.25)
which, in the case of β = 0, simplifies to
d2I(ϕ)
dϕ2
∣∣∣∣
β=0
=
∂I(κ, β)
∂κ
d2κ
dϕ2
∣∣∣∣
β=0
+
∂2I(κ, β)
∂β2
(
dβ
dϕ
)2∣∣∣∣∣
β=0
. (C.26)
Calculating both terms explicitly, we find
∂I(κ, β)
∂κ
d2κ
dϕ2
∣∣∣∣
β=0
= −C
2
(log2 (1 + C)− log2 (1− C)) (C.27)
as well as
∂2I(κ, β)
∂β2
(
dβ
dϕ
)2∣∣∣∣∣
β=0
=
C2
ln 2
. (C.28)
Hence, we arrive at
d2I(ϕ)
dϕ2
∣∣∣∣
β=0
=
C2
ln 2
− C
2
(log2 (1 + C)− log2 (1− C)) . (C.29)
Since the values of C are restricted to the interval 0 < C < 1, we can evaluate the
logarithms with help of the series representation
ln(1 + x) =
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n+1x
n
n
(C.30)
valid for |x| < 1, and the relation
log2 x =
lnx
ln 2
(C.31)
for converting the binary to the natural logarithm leads us to the identity
log2 (1 + C)− log2 (1− C) =
2
ln 2
∞∑
n=0
C2n+1
2n+ 1
(C.32)
or
log2 (1 + C)− log2 (1− C) =
2C
ln 2
+
2
ln 2
∞∑
n=1
C2n+1
2n+ 1
. (C.33)
When we insert this relation into (C.29), we find
d2I(ϕ)
dϕ2
∣∣∣∣
β=0
= − C
ln 2
∞∑
n=1
C2n+1
2n+ 1
≤ 0, (C.34)
with equality if and only if C = 0. Thus, the extremum β = 0 corresponds to a
maximum.
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Appendix D. Random measurements of the user
In Section 3 we have considered the case in which the same projective measurement
direction was chosen in each subsystem and for each experimental run. However, in
general both the user and the attacker are not restricted to a specific measurement
direction but can select in each measurement a different one. In this Appendix,
we discuss the special case in which the user is able to choose between two distinct
measurement directions at random, while we assume that the attacker stays with one.
This procedure is not necessarily the best approach for the attacker to pursue in
order to maximize his information on the user’s bit, but a realistic one if the attacker
has neither the possibility to know the user’s specific choice each time, or if he can only
act passively, that is he cannot control the measurement on the environment.
If, on the other hand, the attacker knew the measurement strategy, he could also
perform measurements in two directions, correlated to the user’s measurements. In this
case the user’s advantage is lost, since it reduces to the case of a single measurement
direction in both A and B, discussed in Section 2.
Appendix D.1. Joint probabilities
We now consider the scenario in which the user randomly chooses with equal probability
from the two measurement directions e
(1)
A and e
(2)
A which are both perpendicular to the
Bloch vector aA, but differ by an angle γ with 0 ≤ γ ≤ pi.
Here, the constraint of the vectors being perpendicular to the Bloch vector, is again
made in order to obtain uniformly distributed bits a, that is
W
e
(1)
A
(a) = W
e
(2)
A
(a) =
1
2
(D.1)
following from (15). In contrast, the attacker uses a single measurement direction eB.
The joint probability
W{e(j)A },eB
(a, b) =
1
2
(
W
e
(1)
A ,eB
(a, b) +W
e
(2)
A ,eB
(a, b)
)
, (D.2)
is the average value of the probabilities W
e
(1)
A ,eB
and W
e
(2)
A ,eB
, which are given by (18),
of the individual measurement directions, since both measurement directions e
(1)
A and
e
(2)
A are independent of each other and occur with the same probability.
We write (D.2) in the form
W{e(j)A },eB
(a, b) =
1
4
(
1 + (−1)bβ + (−1)a+bκeff
)
(D.3)
with a new effective correlation parameter
κeff =
(
e
(1)
A + e
(2)
A
2
)>
K˜eB (D.4)
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When we define the unit vector
eA ≡ e
(1)
A + e
(2)
A
|e(1)A + e(2)A |
, (D.5)
which is again perpendicular to the Bloch vector aA, we obtain
κeff = cos
(γ
2
)
eAKeB, (D.6)
since we have
|e(1)A + e(2)A | =
√
2(1 + cos γ) = 2 cos
(γ
2
)
. (D.7)
Apart from the constant factor cos(γ/2) the correlation parameter κeff, (D.6), is
the same as the correlation parameter κ, (21), for the case of single measurement.
By using (19), together with eA,z = 0, we find
κeff = CeffeA,xeB,x − CeffeA,yeB,y, (D.8)
with the effective correlation
Ceff ≡ C cos
(γ
2
)
. (D.9)
Appendix D.2. Discussion and caviat
By comparing (D.8) with (28) for the case of eA,z = 0, we see that they only differ by
in their concurrence.
Hence, the maximal mutual information still has the form of (45), with the
concurrence C being replaced by Ceff.
The case γ = 0, that is when both measurements coincide with another, reduces to
the one of a single measurement direction, discussed in Section 3. However, for γ > 0,
we have cos(γ/2) < 1, and thus the maximal mutual information is decreased compared
to a single measurement direction. Indeed, by choosing γ = pi, the maximal achievable
mutual information is reduced to Imax = 0, independent of the concurrence of the state.
In this scenario the user randomly chooses orthogonal measurement directions.
Hence, the randomness originates from the fact that he randomly assigns different bit
values to the same measurement result. As a consequence, the user would need another
QRNG to create this randomness, in this way he puts turtles on top of turtles.
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